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Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to define a logical language to
express information sharing policies for multi-agent sys-
tems, which have to cope with dynamical environments.
We propose to use a first-order logic base language to
express policies via concepts like time, action, context,
roles in organizations and deontic notions. We define then
consistency for a sharing policy and propose two defini-
tions for policy completeness.
1 Introduction
In case of major catastrophe, France has an
emergency support plan called ORSEC (Orga-
nisation des secours, rescue organization)[1].
ORSEC aims to organize five different services :
– first-aid and rescue, assured by the sapeurs-
pompiers (firemen),
– medical care and aid, assured by the SAMU
(Service d’Aide Médicale d’Urgence, urgency
medical care service) and DDASS (Direction
Départementale des Affaires Sanitaires et So-
ciales, local direction for sanitary and social
affairs),
– police and intelligence, assured by the police
(both civil and military),
– telecommunications, assured by the STI (Ser-
vice de Transmission de l’Intérieur),
– transport and infrastructure works, assured
by the DDE (Direction Départementale de
l’Equipement)
Notice that other means can be used in the
ORSEC plan, for instance international orga-
nizations like the Red Cross or individuals to
help rescuing victims. What interests us in this
example is that ORSEC creates a multi-agent
system composed by different services and orga-
nizations to react in an efficient way. This multi-
agent system is centrally managed by what is
called the DOS (Direction des Opérations de
Secours, rescue operations management) in the
COD (Centre Opérationnel Départemental, lo-
cal operations center).
In such a system, command and control units
of different services need to share information
coming from lots of sources (such as units re-
ports sources or other ones), in order to have
for instance a common representation of the cri-
sis situation, and then take relevant decisions to
achieve their mission. They also have to cope
with amounts of pieces of partial information,
with short information processing time limits.
Moreover, such information sharing takes place
in a high risk environment [14] :
– trust relation between services may change
over the time,
– trust relations may be not symmetric between
services,
– people may change their role in the organi-
zation of the coalition, and so change their
“need to know”.
In such conditions, there is quite a big threat of
violating information security properties, such
as confidentiality (no unauthorized divulging of
secrete information) or availability (information
must be available according to users’ rights).
This may have disastrous consequences for re-
scue efficiency. For instance, some informations
may be hidden to population to avoid panic.
So, in order for users to trust an information ex-
change system, it is necessary to control and re-
gulate information broadcast within the system.
Given a distributed information exchange sys-
tem to be designed, one issue is to provide its
designers with a sharing policy to protect infor-
mation and, through information, every service
involved in the multi-agent system. A sharing
policy can be seen as a regulation which spe-
cifies authorized, permitted or prohibited diffu-
sion of information within the system.
For example, in such a sharing policy, one could
express rules such as :
– in a context of occurrence of any event rela-
ted to a risk of pollution, information about
this event must be sent to the DOS before 30
minutes. In this rule the context is defined by
a kind of event, and information must be sent
to someone who plays the role of DOS in the
organization of K.
– in a context of crisis, any piece of information
connected to the topic “explosion risk” must,
as soon as learned by an agent a, be sent to
an agent b within less than 5 minutes. It is
worthwhile sending the piece of information
in such a short time, because it will become
quickly irrelevant.
– in every context, everybody is forbidden to
send pieces of information with a security le-
vel of n to anybody whose habilitation level
is less than n. Such a rule may be used in a
multi-agent system where each piece of infor-
mation and each agent are assigned respecti-
vely a security and an habilitation level.
A sharing policy can be useful for several is-
sues : specify an information exchange system,
increase the trust of its users (denoted agents in
the remainder of this paper) and the system re-
liability, thus making it really useful. For this
reason, it is important to get a “good” sharing
policy : the quality of a sharing policy depends
on some properties such as its consistency or its
completeness.
As the subject of this paper is connected with
system information security, we take our ins-
piration from a well known approach in this
field, consisting in defining security policies in
order to preserve security properties of infor-
mation (mainly, confidentiality, availability, and
integrity). What can we learn from it ? On the
one hand, since actors of a multi-agent system
are often official services, we could think about
using mandatory models [2, 3], where users’
rights are defined by their organization. With
this approach, rights cannot easily be changed
over time and cannot be delegated to other users.
On the other hand, discretionary access control
models [11] allow each subject (or active enti-
ties) to give its access rights on an object (or
information container) to other subjects. Un-
fortunately, they may lead to information leak
and so violate confidentiality. Both kinds of
models only explicitly regulate permission ac-
cess to pieces of information, obligation access
being implicitly managed through the informa-
tion system specifications. However the pre-
vious examples of rules show that we need obli-
gation rules for information diffusion, at least
for information relevance and availability rea-
sons. Moreover, the rules defining obligation
about sharing must be explicit, in order to be
able to verify some properties on the whole set
of sharing rules.
The aim of this paper is first to define a for-
malism to help one to express a sharing policy
(section 2). This formalism will be based upon
deontic concepts and first order logic. We de-
fine then within this framework the properties
of consistency and completeness for a sharing
policy in sections 3 and 4. We will then sketch
further issues for this preliminary work.
2 A formalism for expressing infor-
mation sharing policies
In this section, we will present the concepts used
in our formalism, a logical framework to re-
present and to reason about them and a method
for expressing policies.
2.1 Useful concepts
In order to express a sharing policy, we need
the following primitive concepts : time, actions,
properties, deontic modalities and contexts. We
will present them in the following.
Time is an important concept, because the deon-
tic notions associated with information sharing
will change over time. We need to distinguish
three temporal dimensions :
– the time at which an information is valid,
– the time at which an agent gets an informa-
tion,
– the time at which an agent sends an informa-
tion.
Those three notions are necessary. For instance,
we may express that an agent is obliged to send
an information as soon as he gets it and to send it
before a certain amount of time. In this case, we
have to know the time at which the agent sends
the information in order to verify that he has not
violated the previous obligation.
We will consider only two actions in our frame-
work :
– learn(x, i, t) which means that agent x learns
information i at time t,
– send(x, i, y, t) which means that agent x sends
information i to an agent y at time t.
Properties represent general assertions about the
current state of the world. We can distinguish
the time-dependent properties form the others.
For instance :
– Level(x, l, t) : the habilitation level (respecti-
vely the security level) of an agent (respec-
tively an information) x is l at time t. In in-
formation security, the definition of Level va-
lues is often based upon a lattice. For instance,
we can distinguish “Classified” and “Top-
secret” information and express with the lat-
tice that classified information is more confi-
dential than top-secret information.
– Topic(i, to) : the information i deals with topic
to.
– Playsrole(x, r, o, t) : the agent x plays the role
r in the organization o at time t.
– Hsuperior(x, y, o, t) : the role x is hierarchi-
cally superior to the role y in the organization
o at time t.
As we want to express norms, i.e. rules which
specify what must, may or must not be done,
we need deontic modalities, particularly about
information sharing. Therefore, we introduce
classical deontic concepts of obligation, prohi-
bition and permission for information sending :
– Obligatory(send(x, i, y, t)) means that agent x
is obliged to send the information i at time t
to agent y,
– Prohibited(send(x, i, y, t)) means that agent x
is prohibited to send the information i at time
t to agent y,
– Permitted(send(x, i, y, t)) means that agent x
is permitted to send the information i at time
t to agent y.
Moreover, we need consistency axioms between
these deontic predicates, which are expressed
through the following constraints1 :
– ¬(Permitted(x) ∧ Forbidden(x))
– Obligatory(x)→ Permitted(x)
– ¬(Obligatory(x) ∧ Forbidden(x))
Classically, those constraints express the fact so-
mething obligatory or permitted cannot be for-
1Notice that the third one can be deduced from the first two.
bidden, and that something obligatory is permit-
ted.
Finally, notion of context is important here.
Multi-Agent Systems work in dynamical envi-
ronments : crisis, quiet situations, occurrences
of events etc. For instance :
– Occurrence(e, k, t) means that an event e of
kind k occurs at time t.
– Crisis(t) means that there is a crisis situation
at time t.
Information sharing modalities may depend
upon each kind of environment, and we will call
this environment context. Contexts will be men-
tioned in information sharing rules. Therefore,
if c is a context, a general form for a rule r is :
c→ r meaning that rule r applies in context c.
2.2 A logic-based formalism
In this section we propose a logical framework
L in order to deal with the concepts defined pre-
viously. This framework is based upon a typed
first order logic.
We suppose that atomic pieces of shared in-
formation are expressed through a given entity-
relation database model. In such model, entities
represent a kind of “type” (like a firemen rescue
unit) and entity instance a particular object of
this type. Objects can be composite objects : for
instance coordinates are composed of two num-
bers. Relations is an association between enti-
ties. For instance, position is a relation between
entity firemen-unit and entity coordinates.
A strong hypothesis in this work is that we will
only deal with atomic informations, like the po-
sition of the object O is (45, 32).
As usual, the alphabet of L will be based on
three distinct groups of symbols : constant sym-
bols, predicate symbols and function symbols.
Let us precise that constant names will be de-
noted by upper Latin symbols (object O, agent
A), whereas variables will be denoted by lower
Latin symbols. Moreover, predicate names will
begin by an upper symbol and function names
by lower symbol.
Finally, as we want to type our language, we will
distinguish different groups of symbols among
those three categories.
Definition 1 We distinguish four sets of
constants :
– I-constants which represent values of the do-
main of the attributes of the information data-
base model.
– Ag-constants which represent agents who
share information in the system.
– T-constants represent time points (essentially
as dates).
– other constants will be denoted by O-
constants.
In the previous example, object O, 45 and 32 are
I-constants. O-constants are used to represent
information topic (localization in our example),
or security levels for instance.
Definition 2 We characterize predicate symbols
in the following way :
– Obligatory, Permitted and Forbidden are
unary predicates that we call D-predicates
(for deontic predicates).
– Learn(.,.,.) is a ternary predicate symbol.
– contexts are expressed through predicates
with at least one parameter for time. We will
note them C-predicates : Crisis (.), Occur-
rence (.) . . .
– P-predicates will be used to express any kind
of property on informations, agents, etc.
We use predicates to represent deontic notions
as in [9]. Notice that P-predicates include the
classical mathematical operators like > and
=. Some other examples of P-predicates are :
Playsrole(.), Level(.,.,.) etc.
Definition 3 Functions are characterized in the
following way :
– I-functions represent relations of the infor-
mation data base model with corresponding
arity.
– not(.) is a unary-function used to represent
object level negation.
– send(.,.,.,.) is a function with four arguments
representing the action of sending an infor-
mation.
For instance, the position relation in the da-
tabase is represented by the I-function posi-
tion(.,.).
We can now define formulas for L.
Definition 4 Formulas of L are defined recursi-
vely as follows :
– If f is a I-function, if t1, . . . , tn are I-
constants or variables, then f(t1, . . . , tn) and
not(f(t1, . . . , tn)) are I-terms.
– If t1, . . . , tn are constants or variables, if C
is a C-predicate, then C(t1,...,tn is a C-literal
and is a formula of L.
– Let x be an Ag-constant, i be an I-term or a
variable, t be a T-constant or a variable. Then
Learn(x, i, t) is a L-literal and a formula of
L.
– Let x and y be Ag-constants or variables, i be
an I-term or a variable, t be a T-constant or
a variable. Then Obligatory(send(x, i, y, t)),
Permitted(send(x, i, y, t)) and
Forbidden(send(x, i, y, t)) are D-literals.
They are formulas for L.
– If t1, . . . , tn are constants or variables, if P
is a P-predicate, then P (t1, . . . , tn) is a P-
literal, and a formula of L.
– Let F1 and F2 be formulas of L and x be a
variable. Then ¬F1, F1 ∧ F2, F1 ∨ F2, ∀x F1
and ∃x F1 are formulas of L, as it is usually
defined.
2.3 Definition of an information sharing po-
licy
In this section, we define rules for an informa-
tion sharing policy, within the above logical lan-
guage.
An information sharing policy is a set of formu-
las of L which are Horn clauses2 l1∨ l2∨ . . .∨ ln
such that :
– ln is the only positive literal and is a D-literal,
– ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, li is a negative C-literal,
L-literal, P-literal or D-literal,
– if x is a variable in ln, then ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}
such that li is a negative literal and contains
the variable x. This last condition comes from
the definition of restrictive field in the data
bases domain : it aims to characterize signi-
ficative formulas.
Rules of sharing policy can be be expressed by
such formulas.
Example 1 The rule “in a context of crisis and
occurrence of any event related to risk of pol-
lution of the site S, information about this event
2An Horn clause is a clause in which only a literal is positive.
must be sent to the DOS before 10 minutes la-
ter” is expressed with the following formula :
(R0) ∀i ∀t ∀t′ ∀x ∀y ∀e Crisis(t)∧
Playsrole(x,DOS , K, t)∧
occurrence(e,Pollution, t)∧
Learn(y, position(e, S ), t′)→
Obligatory(send(y, position(e, S ), x, t′ + 1))
Example 2 Suppose our policy deals with
confidentiality for informations with a multi le-
vel model ; suppose that in that model, each
piece of information and each agent are assi-
gned respectively a security and an habilitation
level.
The rule “in every context, everybody is forbid-
den to send pieces of information with a security
level of n to anybody whose habilitation level is
less than n” is expressed with the following for-
mula :
(R1) ∀x ∀i ∀y ∀n ∀n′ ∀t0 ∀t1 ∀t2 ∀t3
Learn(x, i, t0) ∧ Learn(x, level(i, n), t1)∧
Learn(y, level(y, n′), t2)∧
(n′ < n) ∧ (t3 > max(t0, t1, t2))→
Forbidden(send(x, i, y, t3))
Notice that there is no context predicate in
this formula, so the rule is applicable in every
context.
Consider now a sharing policy saying that in a
context of crisis, any information about the to-
pic “explosion risk” must, as soon as learned by
agent A, be sent to agent B.
This rule may be expressed with the following
formula :
(R2) ∀i ∀t ∀t′ Crisis(t) ∧ Learn(A, i, t)∧
Learn(x, topic(i,ExplosionRisk), t′)→
Obligatory(send(A, i, B,max (t, t′)))
3 Consistency of an information
sharing policy
Given a situation and a sharing policy, we want
to avoid to deduce that some agent a is both
obligated and prohibited (or permitted and pro-
hibited) to send an information to some other
agent b. In such cases, it would be impossible
for a to know what it has to do. In other words,
a would have to face up with a dilemma. The-
refore, we will classically define the property of
consistency for a sharing policy.
Let Dom be the set of domain knowledge, and
domain meta-knowledge. For instance, it in-
cludes relations between topics concerned by in-
formation.Dommay for instance include follo-
wing knowledge :
(D1) ∀x ∀y ∀z type(x, y)→ topic(type(x, y), y)∧
topic(position((x, z), y))
(D1) means that if the type of x is y, then the in-
formation “the type of x is y” and “the position
of x is z” deal both with the topic y.
(D2) ∀x ∀y ∀z ∀a ∀t Learn(a, type(x, y), t)→
Learn(a, topic(type(x, y), y), t)∧
Learn(a, topic(position(x, z), y), t)
(D2) means that if an agent a learns at time t
that the type of x is y, then at the same time a
learns that the information “the type of x is y”
and “the position of x is z” deal both with the
semantic topic y.
(D3) ∀t ¬(Quiet(t) ∧ Crisis(t))
(D3) means that a context cannot be both quiet
and a crisis context.
(D4)Majorlevel(SD ,CD)
(D4) means that the SD (Top-secret) habilitation
or security level is greater than the CD (Confi-
dential) habilitation or security level, in the case
of a multilevel application.
Let us also add the following axioms about D-
predicates, as stipulated in 2.1 :
(A1) ∀x ¬(Permitted(x) ∧ Forbidden(x))
(A2) ∀x Obligatory(x)→ Permitted(x)
(A3) ∀x ¬(Obligatory(x) ∧ Forbidden(x))
(A1) means that nothing cannot be both permit-
ted and forbidden. (A3)means that nothing can-
not be both obligatory and prohibited and (A2)
means that anything which is obligatory has also
to be permitted. Notice that we can deduce (A3)
from (A1) and (A2).
We can now introduce our definition of consis-
tency for a policy.
Definition 5 Let P a sharing policy, defined as
a set of formulas of L (cf. 2.2). P is said to be
consistent if and only if there does not exist any
set S of clauses without D-literal such that the
logical theory P ∪ {(A1), (A2), (A3)} ∪ S ∪
Dom is inconsistent.
If we are able to find such a set S, then S is the
set of circumstances that can lead to a contra-
diction.
We will next illustrate this definition through
two examples.
Example 3 Let P a sharing policy which says
that in a crisis context :
– (R2) any agent x must send to every agent
y every piece of information dealing with the
topic “risk of explosion” (noted ExpRisk ) as
soon as it has learn it :
(R2) ∀x ∀i ∀y ∀t ∀t′ Crisis(t) ∧ Learn(x, i, t)∧
Learn(x, topic(i,ExpRisk), t′)→
Obligatory(send(x, i, y,max(t, t′)))
– (R3) every agent is forbidden to send any in-
formation dealing with the topic “bacterio-
logical risk” (written Bac) to anybody who
does not play an official role (which is mode-
led here by a NonOff role) :
(R3) ∀x ∀i ∀y ∀t ∀t′ ∀t′′Crisis(t)∧
Learn(x, i, t) ∧ Learn(x, topic(i,Bac), t′)∧
t′′ > max(t, t′) ∧ Playsrole(y,NonOff )→
Forbidden(send(x, i, y, t′′))
Let Dom include the rules (D2) and (D3). Let
us now consider the following scenario :
– there is a crisis context.
– at 10 :00, a learns the spatial position of an
event o and learns that o may include a bac-
teriological risk.
– at 10 :15, a learns that o induces a risk of
explosion.
With P we can deduce that from (D2), at 10 :00
a learns that the information about the position
of o is related to the topicBac. Thus, from (R3),
a is forbidden to send the position of o from
10 :00 to any agent which is not an official orga-
nization. a is in particular forbidden to send the
position of o to the agent b who does not play an
official role at 10 :15.
However, as a learns at 10 :15 that o induces a
risk of explosion, a also learns from (D2) that
the piece of information about the position of
o is related to the topic ExpRisk. Then from
(R2), a is immediately obliged to send it to b.
So at 10 :15, the agent a has to face up with a
dilemma : to send or not to send the position of
o to b.
Let us consider S =
{Learn(a, type(o,Bac), 10 : 00 ),
Learn(a, type(o,ExpRisk), 10 : 15 ),Crisis(10 : 00 )}.
We can show that P ∪ {(A1), (A2), (A3)} ∪
S ∪ Dom is inconsistent. That means that
P is inconsistent according to our previous
definition.
Example 4 Let us consider P ′ composed of two
rules :
– (R2), about diffusion of explosion risk infor-
mation in context of crisis :
(R2) ∀x ∀i ∀y ∀t ∀t′ Crisis(t) ∧ Learn(x, i, t)∧
Learn(x, topic(i,ExpRisk), t′)→
Obligatory(send(x, i, y,max(t, t′)))
– and (R4) : in a quiet context, every agent
is forbidden to send any information dealing
with the semantic topic “bacteriological risk”
(written Bac) to anybody which does not play
an official role :
(R4) ∀x ∀i ∀y ∀t ∀t′ Quiet(t) ∧ Learn(x, i, t)∧
Learn(x, topic(i,Bac), t′)∧
t′′ > max(t, t′) ∧ Playsrole(y,NonOff )→
Forbidden(send(x, i, y, t′′))
From (D3), we cannot be simultaneously in a
quiet and crisis context, there is no situation in
which an agent is simultaneously obligated and
forbidden to send any information dealing both
with ExpRisk and Bac topics. So, according to
our definition, P ′ is consistent.
4 Completeness of an information
sharing politics
Now, the intuition we want to capture is that gi-
ven a sharing policy P , in any situation, P al-
lows to deduce if an agent a is allowed, obliga-
ted or forbidden to send a particular information
to another agent b.
We propose a first definition :
Definition 6 Let P be a sharing policy defined
on L. P is said to be complete if and only if
for every context c, every time constant t, every
couple of agents a and b, and every information
i, the following property is true :
– P |= c→ Obligatory(send(a, i, b, t)) or
– P |= c→ Forbidden(send(a, i, b, t)) or
– P |= c→ Permitted(send(a, i, b, t))
In fact, it is quite difficult to anticipate all pos-
sible cases while defining a sharing policy : our
first definition for completeness is unrealistic.
What seems more realistic is to impose comple-
teness only for important subjects or some to-
pics or restrict completeness to a small group
of agents. For instance, an agent should always
know what to do with an important information.
Thus, we propose a weaker definition for com-
pleteness.
Definition 7 Let P be a sharing policy defined
on L. Let D(x, i, y, t) a formula of L and C be
an information representing a context. P is said
to be complete for D and C for every couple of
agent x and y if and only if :
– P |= c → (∀x ∀i ∀y ∀t D(x, i, y, t) →
Obligatory(send(x, i, y, t))) or
– P |= c → (∀x ∀i ∀y ∀t D(x, i, y, t) →
Forbidden(send(x, i, y, t))) or
– P |= c → (∀x ∀i ∀y ∀t D(x, i, y, t) →
Permitted(send(x, i, y, t)))
Example 5 Let us resume example 3. The rules
for policy are :
(R2) ∀x ∀i ∀y ∀t ∀t′ Crisis(t) ∧ Learn(x, i, t)∧
Learn(x, topic(i,ExpRisk), t′)→
Obligatory(send(x, i, y,max(t, t′)))
(R4) ∀x ∀i ∀y ∀t ∀t′ Quiet(t) ∧ Learn(x, i, t)∧
Learn(x, topic(i,Bac), t′) ∧ t′′ > max(t, t′)∧
Playsrole(y,NonOff )→
Forbidden(send(x, i, y, t′′))
We can show that this policy is complete for the
following formula :
∃t ∃t′ Learn(x, i, t) ∧ Learn(x, topic(i,Bac), t)∧
t′′ > max(t, t′)
This means that if an agent a knows an informa-
tion and learns that this information has Bac as
topic, then a knows what to do regarding to sen-
ding the information (more precisely, a is for-
bidden to send the information).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have defined a logical frame-
work to express and reason about information
sharing policies for multi-agent system. The
rules expressed in this policy depend on seve-
ral concepts : deontic notions, such as permis-
sion and obligation, time, communication ac-
tions and context.
We have proposed a definition for policy consis-
tency. Consistency allows a policy designer to
verify that an agent cannot face a dilemma
concerning an information. Notice that we can
use SOL deduction [12] to verify efficiently
this consistency and to find the eventual coun-
terexamples (cf. also [9]).
The completeness problem is different and more
difficult. The first definition we proposed is too
restrictive : in order to obtain the completeness
property, the designer of a policy must know in
advance all the possible cases for the policy. We
then proposed a restricted definition for com-
pleteness allowing to consider the property only
for some topics for instance. The designer can
concentrate only on the important domains.
This preliminary work can be extended in seve-
ral directions.
First, we can go deeper on the theoretical frame-
work by proposing a more precise definition for
completeness for instance. Notice also that we
have not treated the classical problems of deon-
tic logic like Contrary-to-Duties [8, 6]. This
study has to be done, particularly in the multi-
agent system context where regulation can be
huge and where such problems may arise. We
can also study obligations with deadline which
is strongly related to our problem [5].
The Learn predicate semantic must also be stu-
died. More precisely, the formal link between
an agent’s beliefs base updates (when the agent
receives an information) [10] and the norms ap-
plication (a permission or an obligation has to
be taken into account at a certain date) is an in-
teresting extension of this work. If we consider
that each agent has a belief base which can be
updated by new information, the “triggers” for
new regulation has to be calculated from the dif-
ference between the agent’s old beliefs and new
beliefs (only new informations have to be consi-
dered).
Finally, in a multi-agent system, the need for in-
formation for an agent is more constrained by
the agent’s role than the agent itself. Several
agents can have the same role in the multi-agent
system, the role of an agent can change during
the multi-agent system mission etc. Thus, we
have introduced in our framework the notion of
role [4, 7]. Moreover, it can be interesting to use
the various works on RBAC (Role-Based Ac-
cess Control) security policies [15, 13]. Using
roles, we can express conditions on the agents’
roles, which is less fastidious than expressing
conditions on agents (the roles in a multi-agent
system are quite stable, whereas the agents can
change frequently). Notice also that the notion
of role has been used in the architecture for se-
cured information sharing in dynamic coalitions
presented in [14]. In our formalism, we have
introduced roles through the predicates Plays-
role and Hsuperior, but this needs more efforts
to have a complete representation of the notions
developed in the cited papers.
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